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HYBRID WARFARE 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Hybrid Warfare 
In this thesis I will discuss a military theory called hybrid warfare, where hybrid is defined as 
something heterogeneous in composition of different elements of ways to wage war.  This 
theory is not part of the United States formal doctrine writing, but it has been an inspiration 
for the ongoing debate among military thinkers since the turn of the 21
st
 Century as the con-
flicts of today are getting more and more complex. Hybrid warfare, although there is no uni-
versal agreed definition, describes well the nature and multi-modality of conflicts the Western 
militaries are part of in Afghanistan or Iraq.  This is probably also a kind of warfare western 
militaries will face in the future, and therefore should be prepared to tackle.  I would describe 
hybrid warfare as a cocktail of conventional military capabilities, insurgencies, terrorism, 
guerrilla warfare, organized crime, cyber warfare and advanced military technology.  This 
kind of warfare may also include violations of international laws of war, and will often also 
include non-state actors and organizations, supported by states with dubious agendas.  All the-
se ingredients may be blended together with an equivocal number of ingredients affecting the 
outcome at the same time.  The magnitude of each ingredient may vary significantly during 
the war depending on the phase of the war or its immediate effectiveness.   
The wars Western militaries are involved in today are different from those that were fought 
before the turn of the 21
st
 Century.  The two Gulf Wars were probably like a dream come true 
for the advocates of military theories like the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which in-
cluded use of large numbers of regular forces, heavy armour, air supremacy, cruise missiles, 
and technological advantage over the adversary.  It seemed warfare had become everything 
Western armies had developed themselves to handle.  
All this was about to change after September 11, 2001 when the Twin Towers, and Pentagon 
were hit by passenger planes hijacked by the terrorist group Al-Qaida.  As a result the United 
States invaded first Afghanistan, and then later attacked Iraq with the help of a Western coali-
tion.  Campaigns, in both Afghanistan and in Iraq, were well executed to the point the two 
countries were conquered and occupied.  But for neither campaign had a clear exit strategy 
been planned. 
4 
 
After the President of the United States, George W. Bush, on board the aircraft carrier USS 
Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003
1
 claimed “Mission Accomplished” in Iraq, little by little the 
U.S. and the coalition forces became involved in an escalating and changing conflict.  The un-
stable internal development in Iraq, with development of extreme political and religious 
groupings, and a difficult social and economic situation for the inhabitants of the occupied 
state, became together the starting point for a growing insurgency.  The occupying forces were 
unable to meet the requirements for local security, political stability and economic develop-
ment – all important factors if the occupation forces hope to gain the respect and confidence 
of the residents in an occupied territory.   
In both countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. forces and their allies faced diverse local 
groups with different agendas (ethnic, political, religious, criminal, terrorism, etc.) that were 
trying to reach their conflicting goals with all means possible.  Some of them were willing to 
use violence, not just the regular gun slinging, but any method of warfare available.  To un-
dermine the allied supported law and order their way to wage war included “advanced con-
ventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and disruptive technologies or criminality to 
destabilize”2 
The Americans were not the only ones facing unexpected ways of how to wage war.  The Isra-
el Defense Forces (IDF) faced a similar modus operandi used by Hezbollah during their Se-
cond Lebanon War in the summer of 2006.  Hezbollah‟s capability to fight and to adapt to the 
changing environment was underestimated by the IDF.  This was not anymore just badly or-
ganized gunmen, but rather a highly motivated, well trained and equipped force with for ex-
ample advanced anti-tank weapons and long-, mid- and short-range missiles.
3
   
To describe these new developments of warfare in the 21
st
 Century, the term “hybrid” was in-
troduced to the military discussion, and eventually the term: hybrid warfare. 
1.2 References 
The theories about so-called hybrid warfare have been the background for a number of arti-
cles in the military periodicals around the world over the last few years, since the term was 
                                                 
1
 CNN Politics, White House pressed on „mission accomplished‟ sign, October 29, 2003, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2003-10-28/politics/mission.accomplished_1_aircraft-carrier-conrad-chun-
banner?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS, 6.12.2010. 
2
 Wilkie, Robert: Hybrid Warfare; Something Old, Not Something New, Air&Space Power Journal, Winter 
2009, volume XXIII, No. 4 ARFP 10-1, 
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/win09/wilkie.html, 25.3.2011. 
3
 Kober, Avi: The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?, The Journal 
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, 3-40, February 2008, pp. 15-16, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390701785211, 1.10.2010. 
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adopted into the military debate.  The theories have inspired some researchers in the American 
military thinkers‟ community, and the issue is indirectly discussed in different Field Manuals 
of the U.S. Armed Forces that mostly deal with counterinsurgency.  To create a picture of 
what hybrid warfare is, we must familiarize ourselves with other types of warfare discussed 
over the last 30 years.  There are some fundamental works that provide the critical background 
for this thesis.   
Thomas M. Huber is the editor and author of articles in the book Compound Warfare: That 
Fatal Knot. The book is a collection of studies of selected conflicts that occurred over an 
about 300 year long period.  In his book Huber presents and explains his theory of what he la-
belled Compound Warfare.  In this thesis, I will use Randall M. Briggs‟ study of the Vietnam 
War published in this book, as an example of compound warfare.
4
  In my study I will also use 
Colin S. Gray‟s paper “Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters”5 there he discusses 
irregular warfare and counterinsurgency, as well as Mr. Hoffman‟ s article “Complex Irregular 
Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs”.6  Irregular warfare is discussed in length 
and comparisons to how hybrid warfare can be made.  From the American point of view, 
counterinsurgency (COIN) surfaced again after 9/11 as a challenge for future military opera-
tions, but not as the only modus operandi.
7
   
Frank G. Hoffman‟s paper “Conflict in the 21st Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars”8 is an in-
teresting introduction to the modern day warfare and the development of hybrid warfare.  Mr. 
Hoffman has also written other articles on the topic.  He has been the most active advocate of 
hybrid warfare, and the need for the American military to take the changing circumstances of 
conflicts more into consideration.
9
 
The United States Government Accountability Office‟s (GAO) study on “Hybrid Warfare” 
from September 2010 is one of the other primary sources for this thesis.  According to that 
document, the U.S. Armed Forces are abandoning the term, since according to them, in differ-
ent branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, hybrid warfare is included in the already existing term 
full spectrum operations, and is thus included in the existing doctrines on traditional and ir-
                                                 
4
 Huber, Thomas M.:  Compound Warfare:  That Fatal Knot, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 
Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002. 
5
 Colin S. Gray: Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 2007, 
www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2007/Winter/gray.pdf, 6.12.2010. 
6
 Frank G. Hoffman: Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs, Elsevier Limited on 
behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute, Summer 2006, pp. 395 – 411. 
7
 Gray, pp. 54-55. 
8 Hoffman, Frank G.: Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Arlington, Virginia, Potomac Insti-
tute for Policy Studies, 2007. 
9
 Hoffman, Frank G: How Marines are preparing for hybrid wars, Armed Forces Journal, March 2006, 
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/03/1813952/, 6.12.2010. 
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regular warfare.  As a result, GAO suggests hybrid warfare should not be considered a new 
form of warfare.  Because of the GAO-report there is now a possibility that the term will dis-
appear from the official doctrines, field manuals and discussion of the United States Army 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
10
 within the next two to three years. Yet hybrid 
threats exist, and this term describes the complexities of modern day conflicts well.
11
   
The following U.S. armed forces and government publications provide an insight to irregular 
warfare and its operational environment: 
 Irregular Warfare Special Study: JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER:  USJFCOM the 
United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Suffolk Virginia, Au-
gust 2004.  
 Department of Defense DIRECTIVE No. 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, December 1, 
2008 
 Field Manual 3-0, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army Washington, 
DC, (Final Approved Draft); this publication supersedes FM 3-0, February 5, 2008. 
 Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 05 Octo-
ber 2009. 
Avi Kober‟s article,”The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor 
Performance?” provides the background for the chapter dealing with an example of a hybrid 
war.  It describes the multiple challenges today‟s Western armies face when fighting an oppo-
nent who uses asymmetric means to meet their goals.
12
   
Anthony H. Cordesman study “Preliminary „Lessons‟ of the Israeli-Hezbollah War”13 from 
2006, and his presentation “The Lessons of the Israeli-Lebanon War”14 from 2008, provide 
concise picture of the failures and successes of both Hezbollah and Israel in the war.  The lat-
ter presentation has more accurate information of the war since more time has lapsed from the 
war and more reliable data has become available. 
                                                 
10
 Command‟s Mission: TRADOC develops the Army's Soldier and Civilian leaders, and designs, develops, and 
integrates capabilities, concepts and doctrine in order to build an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable, adapt-
able, and networked organizations operating on a rotational cycle for Full Spectrum Operations; Support the Ar-
my‟s Human Capital Core Enterprise and sustain the All-Volunteer Force.  
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/about.htm#CommandMission, 10.1.2011. 
11
 United States Government Accountability Office, Hybrid Warfare, Washington, D.C., USA, September 10, 
2010, pp. 2-3. 
12
 Kober, p. 7. 
13
 Cordesman, Anthony H:  Preliminary “Lessons” of the Israeli-Hezbollah War, Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies, Washington, D.C., USA, 2006. 
14
 Cordesman, Anthony H: The Lessons of the Israeli-Lebanon War, Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies, Washington, DC, USA, 2008. 
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The Winograd Commission Final Report reveals the official results of the Israeli investigation 
of the Second Lebanon War 2006, and thus provides the Israeli view on the war as far as suc-
cesses and failures are concerned.
15
 
The majority of the references used in this thesis are public and accessible through internet.  
They are written in English.  Most of them are published in American military periodicals or 
papers written in military schools or research centres.  I will focus mostly on the American 
view on hybrid warfare.    
1.3 Frame of reference and limitations 
In order to understand the framework of hybrid warfare, one must understand the concepts 
leading to the development of the term.  In this thesis I will define conventional warfare, ir-
regular warfare, compound warfare and asymmetric warfare, but the focus will be on com-
pound warfare and hybrid warfare.  These types of warfare have been discussed in military 
literature over the last 30 years due to the nature of conflicts the western military establish-
ments have been involved in over that period of time.  It is essential to understand the differ-
ences of these definitions when discussing hybrid warfare because it can be said hybrid war-
fare evolved from them over time. 
First, let us begin by defining the types of warfare discussed in this thesis.   
Conventional warfare can be described as the kind of war two or more states wage against 
each other, using their regular forces and national armies to reach their respective political or 
military goals.  These armies fight battles and follow the rules of war, at least to some degree, 
and the warring parties expect their counterparts to abide by these rules.  
Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and in-
fluence over the relevant population(s).  Irregular warfare favours indirect and asymmetric ap-
proaches though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode 
an adversary‟s power, influence, and will.16  Irregular warfare includes acts of terrorism, in-
surgency and other unconventional methods, as well as the countermeasures for each i.e. 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.   
Compound warfare is the simultaneous use of a regular or main force and an irregular or guer-
rilla force against an enemy.  In other words, the compound warfare operator increases his 
                                                 
15
 Winograd Commission Final Report, January 30, 2008, Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.crf.org/publication/15385/winograd_commission_final_report.html, 7.12.2010. 
16
 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms: Joint Publication 1-02, 12 April 2001, 
amended September 30, 2010. 
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military leverage by applying both conventional and unconventional force at the same time.
17
  
Compound warfare will be discussed at length in chapter 2.  It is a combination of conven-
tional and irregular warfare, including elements of both used to reach the common goal. 
The term asymmetric warfare describes an alternative way to fight a war, a way for a weaker 
party to counter the stronger opponent.  In asymmetric warfare the weaker party uses his own 
strengths to strike at the enemy‟s characteristic weaknesses.  So-called unconventional or un-
orthodox tactics are typically included in the weaker party‟s toolbox.  The approach includes 
surprise and unpredictability.  The weaker party tries to deny the stronger party of the ability 
to use his strengths and countermeasures effectively by forcing him to fight in unfavourable 
circumstances.   Asymmetric warfare can be seen to include irregular and hybrid features of 
warfare, but as a term it is not clearly defined. 
In the text “Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach” Rear Admiral 
Chris Parry (retired) of the Royal Navy describes hybrid warfare as:   
“Hybrid warfare is conducted by irregular forces that have access to the more sophisticated 
weapons and systems normally fielded by regular forces.  Hybrid warfare may morph and 
adapt throughout an individual campaign, as circumstances and resources allow.  It is antici-
pated that irregular groups will continue to acquire sophisticated weapons and technologies 
and that intervention forces will need to confront a variety of threats that have in the past 
been associated primarily with the regular Armed Forces of states.”18   
In addition to the types of warfare mentioned above, significant additions to hybrid warfare 
are the elements of criminality and cyber warfare.  These two elements make it even more 
comprehensive than the other types of warfare mentioned before. 
In this thesis I intend to discuss the theory of hybrid warfare and compound warfare, the pre-
decessor of hybrid warfare, from the point of view of terminology, definition and two case 
studies.  I will explain the differences of each term and the becoming of the military theory of 
hybrid warfare.  I will demonstrate the differences and similarities of the terms, if there are 
any.  I will focus on the views of the United Stated Armed Forces, since the Americans have 
been dominating the theoretical military thinking over the last two decades due to the fact that 
they are the world‟s strongest military power today.    
Frame of reference in this thesis presented in figure 1.
19
  
                                                 
17
 Huber, p. 1. 
18
 Wilkie, p. 1. 
19
 This frame of reference is a developed version and influenced by Government Accountability Office report on 
hybrid warfare.  United States Government Accountability Office: Hybrid Warfare, Washington, DC, USA, Sep-
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Figure 1: Hybrid Warfare seen in context with other forms of warfare. 
1.4 Research questions and methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the following question: 
 What is the thinking behind the development of the hybrid warfare theories?   
Follow up questions are:   
 What is hybrid warfare?  
 How does it differ from compound warfare or full spectrum of operations?   
In this thesis I will use qualitative data analysis for analysing the concepts of warfare from the 
available literature with the development of thought about warfare over time in mind.  First, I 
will use two case studies as examples of compound warfare and hybrid warfare.  Then, I will 
introduce full spectrum operations as described in the United States Department of Army 
Field Manual No. 3-0 Operations – the current doctrine of the United States Army for con-
ducting military operations. 
As Case 1, I will use the Vietnam War (1965-1975) to further define compound warfare, 
probably the starting point for the development of thoughts leading to the concept of hybrid 
warfare. Why will I use the Vietnam War?  The Communist side‟s use of both conventional 
                                                                                                                                                        
tember 10, 2010, Figure 2, the Hybrid Warfare Concept, p. 16. 
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and irregular forces under the same command (provided by the North Vietnamese leadership) 
secured that they were fighting for a clear political and military goal. Ultimately, this strategy 
for a long war against the enemies lead to the U.S. (and South Vietnamese) defeat in Vietnam. 
The war may be looked upon as a good example of a modern form of compound warfare. The 
Vietnam War involves the American military, which represents the angle I have chosen for 
this thesis – the American point of view. The Americans possessed all the most updated 
weapon systems of the time, and during the Vietnam War conventional weapon systems dom-
inated. The Communist side also had access to modern weapons received from Soviet Union 
and China. But the long “local war” for control over the South Vietnamese hamlets and vil-
lages depended on use of well-trained cadres and small arms and the use of political pressure, 
terror and persuasion, in a fight for influence over the population. Here the guerrilla forces had 
an important function, and were a very important support to the main forces from North Vi-
etnam. It is the combination of irregular and conventional forces which is the centre of Com-
pound warfare as a theoretical concept. This thinking has developed using analysis of histori-
cal conflicts - it is “historically tested” so to speak, and it works provided that the circum-
stances are correct. 
As Case 2, I will use the Second Lebanon War (2006).  Why use this war as a case study?  
Although this war did not involve U.S. forces, but was fought by the Israeli armed forces, it 
serves as an excellent example of what hybrid war can look like in the future.  It is considered 
among the American military writers as a good example of hybrid warfare, since it involved 
multiple dimensions of war, thus fitting into the description of hybrid warfare.
20
  Hybrid war-
fare as term may be looked upon as a new military theory with the aim to better understand 
the conflicts of today. It is not yet a practically tested and clearly defined term like compound 
warfare. 
By comparing these two cases and full spectrum operations, noting the similarities and differ-
ences, if there are any, I will demonstrate the development of thought behind hybrid warfare, 
and the American need to understand the conflicts of today.  In both of the case studies pre-
sented before, there is the stronger, overpowering force and then the underdog that should not 
have any chance to win the conflict.  The analysis of these two conflicts should also give an-
swers to why there was a need to bring a new term into discussion and how it came to be. 
 
                                                 
20
 Hoffman, Frank G.: “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges”, Joint Force Quarterly, issue 51, 1st quarter, 2009, p.37. 
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2 CASE 1:  VIETNAM WAR 
“War is the highest, most comprehensive test of a nation and its social system.  War 
is a contest that not only tests the skill and strategy of the two adversaries, but also 
their strength and will.  Victory goes to the side which has the correct military strat-
egy, which makes the vest use of the art of military science and which most success-
fully limits the war-making capacity of its adversary.”21 
2.1 Background 
The Vietnamese people have fought against their neighbours, among themselves, or against 
the French colonialists from the days of the 16
th
 century competing royal families to the inva-
sion and rule of the French empire.   There was a long tradition in Vietnam for popular upris-
ings against the official authorities prior to the American involvement in Vietnam from the 
late 1950‟s.  The French rule in Indochina ended as a result of the First Indochina War (1946-
1954).  The French empire had been significantly weakened during the Second World War 
and in the end it could not resist the Vietnam Independence League (Vietminh), a Communist 
organization, formed by a Communist intellectual Ho Chi Minh. After the declaration of In-
dependence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in September 1945, the French 
began a military campaign to topple Ho‟s declared nation.  Both sides demonstrated violence 
and brutality, but even with the superior numbers of French and Vietnamese troops and after 
winning most of the many battles, the French was never able to secure control of the country-
side.  The war culminated in the French defeat at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954.
22
 
At the Geneva Accords in July 1954, Indochina was divided into four independent countries, 
namely Cambodia, Laos, North- and South Vietnam.  The division of Vietnam was intended 
to be temporary, pending on nationwide elections.  The communists, led by Ho, were especial-
ly strong in North Vietnam, and the French and their Vietnamese installed leadership had 
some popular support in South Vietnam (especially among the Catholic minority and city 
dwellers).  Eventually South Vietnam was renamed by the existing government as the Repub-
lic of Vietnam (RVN).  The elections to be held in accordance with the Geneva Accords were 
cancelled; the French were evicted and replaced by the Americans as supporters of the non-
Communist South Vietnam. The regime in Saigon had problems gaining strong support in the 
rural population since they were seen by the peasantry as an alien urban elite, the heirs of the 
                                                 
21
 Senior General Van Tien Dung, People‟s Army of Vietnam,  Briggs (in Huber) Randall M.: Compound War-
fare in the Vietnam War, in Huber, p. 221 
22
 Briggs (in Huber), pp. 221-223.  Davidson, Philip B.: Vietnam at War: The History: 1946-1975, Presidio 
Press, Novato, CA, USA, 1988, p 269, 280. 
12 
 
French. Moreover, it did not help that in the eyes of the peasants, the existing non-Communist 
government seemed to be more interested in staying in power rather than correcting the ineq-
uities created by the French, or improving the living standards of the peasants.  By 1960, the 
existing South Vietnamese government had made mistakes and lost the support of the majori-
ty of the people. Corruption, lack of economic progress, extortion and theft of private individ-
uals, torture of prisoners, and falsifying elections, were real problems.  The seed for the up-
coming conflict was well planted.
23
 The Americans were now the main supporters of the Sai-
gon regime, but they did not run the country, and were not in a position to politically control 
the developments. 
As early as in the mid 1950‟s the communists of North Vietnam had started planning an in-
surgency in South Vietnam to eventually unify the divided country.  They planned to execute 
this by toppling the South Vietnamese leadership through a three phase insurgency.  First, they 
were to establish a political organization in South Vietnam and gain the support from espe-
cially the rural population. Second, they would advance into guerrilla warfare against carefully 
selected targets, and finally they would combine the guerrilla warfare operations and the use 
of conventional (full time) main force.
24
  All of these may be seen as typical elements of com-
pound warfare. 
2.2 National Liberation Front (NLF) 
In the battle against the French in the First Indochina War Vietminh demonstrated its capabil-
ity to fight successfully against a Western colonial power.  The purpose of Vietminh had been 
to attract non-Communist nationalists and other democratic elements into a combined effort 
against the French to unify and liberate Vietnam.  The support of these other elements was not 
based on the Communist political long term aims, but rather built on their temporarily adopt-
ed nationalist aims. Vietminh was thus seen as representing the entire people of Vietnam, ra-
ther than just the Communist.
25
  As a result of the Genève Accords, Vietminh was to with-
draw its troops North of the 17
th
 parallel and as a result about 80,000 troops were moved to 
the North, but about 10,000 clandestine cadres remained in the south and eventually were to 
play an important role in the Communist insurgency during the Vietnam War against the re-
gime in South Vietnam and later also against the Americans.
26
 
                                                 
23
 Briggs (in Huber), pp. 224-225. 
24
 Ibid., p. 226. 
25
 Joes, Anthony James: Victorious Insurgencies: Four Rebellions That Shaped Our World, The University Press 
of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, USA, 2010, p. 81; Ahern, Thomas L. Jr.:  Vietnam DECLASSIFIED: The 
CIA and Counterinsurgency, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, USA, 2010, pp. 1-2. 
26
 Briggs (in Huber), pp. 224; Ahern, p. 16. 
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From the mid-1950‟s the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam included assassinations of 
government officials, anti-communist teachers, secret police agents, etc.  Bad government of-
ficials were often left in office just to advertise the inefficiency of the existing government.  
The South Vietnamese government responded to these rising numbers of assassinations by 
publishing tighter anti-insurgency laws prescribing harsh punishments for anti-government ac-
tivity.  This, in contrast, was one of the reasons behind the official birth of the National Liber-
ation Front (NLF) in South Vietnam in 1960.  The core of the NLF-cadres was formed from 
the Vietminh cadres left in the South after the First Indochina War.  It also included Southern 
Communists and it included some representatives from several non-communist opposition 
factions.  Because of this, it easily gained supported among the South Vietnamese reformers 
as well as Western liberals, as it was not recognized entirely as a Communist party, but rather 
a party with a nationalist agenda to unify the two Vietnams, and thus representing a broad 
spectrum of Vietnamese society.   Eventually its sub-organizations People‟s Liberation Army 
(PLA), the military wing of NLF, and People‟s Revolutionary Party (PRP) were established.  
The South Vietnamese government called these organizations Vietnamese Communists, or 
“Vietcong”.  In the eyes of Vietnamese people, the NLF was heir of Vietminh, and it was con-
trolled by North Vietnam.
27
 
The members of the NLF cadre worked hard to win the support of the peasants, since initially 
the Communists were forced to develop their own logistical support in South Vietnam.  The 
Communists had realised that the support of the rural class was necessary to reach their goal.  
It helped that the South Vietnamese society, landlords, and ARVN had suppressed and disre-
spected the peasants over time.  The NLF emphasized that the land belonged to the peasants, 
(but did not say anything about the ultimate goal – all the peasants should work on collec-
tives).  Although the Saigon regime had tried to re-enforce its authority over the landlords, 
they did as they wanted, and these unsuccessful attempts made it difficult to gain the support 
of most ordinary peasants.  The NLF representatives and Saigon government appointees were 
often seen among the peasants as opposite forces.  The NLF respected and brought status to 
the peasants who had not received respect in the past, whereas the Saigon‟s appointees came 
from a different social class which the peasants could not relate to.  In the early 1960s the 
NLF provided better future prospects for the peasants and their children than the Saigon gov-
ernment, and thus the NLF kept gaining support among the peasants.
28
 
                                                 
27
 Briggs (in Huber), pp. 226-227, p. 230. 
28
 Ibid., pp. 228-229. 
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The military wing of NLF, PLA was organized in two levels, namely full military force units 
(main force) and paramilitary or guerrilla force units.  These guerrilla force units were divided 
into two types, regional or territorial guerrillas and local guerrillas.  From the very beginning 
PLA was directed from Hanoi.  The idea was that PLA was self-supporting and self-contained 
in terms of supplies and personnel.  It was not until 1968 that Hanoi began openly supporting 
the PLA, till then the support was quite limited.
29
   
From the point of view of the theories behind the concept of compound warfare, all the ele-
ments were there:  the North Vietnamese government had its own conventional force (PAVN 
– People‟s Army of Vietnam, North), and the NLF‟s military wing was organized as a guerril-
la force (PLA), with a developed political ideology and a clear goal to unify the two Vietnams.  
In order to improve its odds of succeeding, the Communist regime in North Vietnam needed 
foreign strong allies to back up the effort.  Allies were found in China and the Soviet Union.  
Hence the war in Vietnam categorizes as a fortified compound warfare – compound warfare 
with external supporters.  Of the two foreign supporters, China was in the 1960s the most im-
portant, providing Ho Chi Minh‟s troops with training camps and advisors, and a show of 
force of 200,000 troops across the border.  Yet North Vietnam‟s relationship and attitude to-
wards these two supporters was complicated, due to the fact that neither had worked in favour 
of North Vietnams interests in the Geneva Accords negotiations back in 1954.
30
 
2.3 Early American involvement 
President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961 and brought new spirit and hope to the Ameri-
can people. Yet the Cold War was at its peak and the confrontation between the West and East 
was at the centre of the U.S. policy making.  The United States and the Soviet Union fought 
fiercely in the world of international politics to maintain acquired positions and to increase the 
support of their own ideology.  Vietnam was, from the American point of view, an important 
stage to stop the spread of international Communism.
31
 Although the Kennedy Administration 
saw the problems were mounting in South Vietnam, the withdrawal of support from South 
Vietnam was rejected.
32
 
The more direct American involvement in South Vietnam started with limited military assis-
tance to the regime.  With the help of the so-called Military Assistance and Advisory Group 
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(MAAG) the Americans helped South Vietnam reorganize its army.  With strong American 
influence, it was organized into divisions and corps and was partly mechanized.  It was not 
well suited for fighting insurgents or guerrillas, but rather to meet the American threat scenar-
ios, meaning to have the capability to defend against a conventional invasion from North Vi-
etnam, in the same way as the North Korean Communists had started the Korean War.  Thus 
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was designed primary for conventional war-
fare, i.e. for meeting a conventional attack from North Vietnam, which was a likely scenario at 
that time.  The insurgents were to be fought by police, the secret police and local security 
forces.  Of these the latter actually ended up more or less protecting provincial administra-
tions, and thus demonstrating the inexistent support for the South Vietnamese government, 
since there was a clear need to protect local administration offices.
33
 
Regardless of the MAAG help, the ARVN was not successful in fighting the PLA.  A typical 
ARVN operation of the early 1960‟s resulted in little and gave often a propaganda victory to 
the NLF, due to heavy damages to civilian structures and many civilian casualties.  Even when 
the ARVN outnumbered the PLA in every aspect in the battlefield, the results were poor.  
ARVN had problems with its leadership and badly motivated troops.  ARVN officers were in-
experienced and frequently disobeyed orders that did not suit them.  The South Vietnamese 
leadership misused troops, ordering them to avoid decisive contact with the guerrillas.  The 
incompetence of the ARVN became evident throughout the war in Vietnam. The internal 
problems were seen already during the French rule and was never completely solved even dur-
ing the American involvement in the war.  Worst of all, the nature of the problems was mis-
understood by the ARVN itself, and by the South Vietnamese leadership.  The PLA was suc-
cessful because it had the support of the rural population.  ARVN‟s battle tactics emphasized 
air and artillery attacks (the use of firepower), which worsened the situation and alienated 
people even further.  The artillery and air strikes were supported by the U.S. Air Force and re-
sulted in tens of thousands of refugees hostile to the Saigon government.
34
 
The U.S. Army faced guerrilla warfare in Vietnam from the beginning to the end.  This threat 
was recognized by the Kennedy Administration in the early 1960‟s, and correct analysis to 
some degree was made of the necessary steps to be taken in South Vietnam in order to meet 
the communist threat. Yet the most fundamental fact was not understood, the fact that the 
South Vietnamese Government during the 1960s did not have the support of its own people.  
In order to gain support of its own people fundamental reforms by the Saigon regime were es-
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sential.
35
  The early American involvement included significant interest in counterinsurgency 
(COIN), but this was eventually overpowered by the conventional warfare way of thinking.  
The American military leadership favoured firepower, using artillery and airpower as the an-
swer to the Communist insurgency, which, of course, scored no points in the eyes of the peo-
ple of South Vietnam.  
2.4 Expanded Commitment 
In 1963 the United States covertly participated in a military coup which included the assassi-
nation of the President of South Vietnam (Ngô Đình Diệm).  After the coup South Vietnam 
plunged into chaos during a succession of unstable military governments.
36
  Being part of the 
disposal of the earlier South Vietnamese leadership, the U.S. was forced to support his succes-
sors.  President Kennedy was assassinated the same year (1963).  Kennedy‟s legacy of foreign 
policy was an expanded commitment to South Vietnam as an experiment in counterinsurgen-
cy.  President Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded Kennedy and he continued in the footsteps laid 
out by his predecessor in terms of assisting the South Vietnamese against the Communist con-
spiracy.
37
  Initially, President Johnson was reluctant to commit American combat troops to 
South Vietnam, but little by little he increased the American effort in South Vietnam, from 
military advice and support to direct military action.  By mid 1965, the United States was 
committing ground forces to the war, with no clear victory at hand or even visible.  From the 
American perspective, the conflict kept escalating.
38
 
The Americans faced four major restrictions connected with their military involvement in the 
war in Vietnam.  First, the RVN government was not legitimate in the eyes of the population; 
as it had a limited support among the population.  The Americans failed to realize this.  Se-
cond, from around 1964 the NLF was widely supported in the rural areas.  The young and 
bright peasants had better expectations of the future by becoming a member of the NLF rather 
than the government organisations.  Third, the Americans recognized the necessity to gain 
support in the rural areas, and thus tried to improve the RVN position there, but found it very 
difficult to obtain results.  And finally, the ARVN was no match for the PLA in the mid 
1960s, and was losing on all fronts.  It was evident that ARVN could not defeat PLA alone, 
meaning that a considerable contribution of American forces was needed to defeat PLA before 
a successful nation building could begin.  To defeat the PLA, the Americans had to use fire-
power, which on the other hand, at the same time caused great destruction and loss of civilian 
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life.  The war against the PLA worked counterproductively in terms of the second and third 
restriction mentioned above, but it was a precondition for the fourth and indirectly to the first 
restriction, since the Americans caused casualties and destruction to the Vietnamese areas 
controlled by the NLF.  And all was done in support of the not very popular RVN govern-
ment.
39
 
In 1965, as the American troop numbers grew, the PLA in South Vietnam, supported with in-
filtrated cadres and military units from North Vietnam, responded to the growing pressure by 
moving to third phase of the insurgency, meaning conventional, large unit confrontations.  
The PLA leadership estimated that they could destroy the ARVN and encourage the American 
withdrawal.  This was a miscalculation and the PLA suffered heavy casualties that year.  The 
step to the phase three was taken too early.  The PLA‟s unconventional warfare had previously 
worked well, and the new conventional warfare did not. Important lessons were learned that 
year for both sides.  The insurgents realised that they could fight the American troops and 
“win”, by their own definition (which included accepting heavy casualties).  The Americans 
may win a battle physically in the jungle, but soon after they retreated and then the insurgents 
would reoccupy the area.
40
  If PLA could “win battles” according to their own definition, they 
could win the war.  The Americans on the other hand learned that regardless of favourable kill 
ratios during the battles (12:1 at best), a growing part of the American public was not ready 
for the increased casualty rate of the war, regardless of how many enemies were killed at the 
expense of the lives of their sons.  The idea of attrition warfare, bleeding the enemy to death, 
was suffering serious blows.
41
 
The Americans increased the volume of air campaigning along with the increase of operations 
on the ground.  Operation ROLLING THUNDER was carried out against North Vietnamese 
targets.  It was supposed to last for eight weeks, but ended up lasting three and a half years 
(from March 1965 to November 1968).
42
  During this air campaign one million tons of bombs 
were dropped, about eight hundred tons a day, without any significant favourable political re-
sults.  One reason was that the DRV had anticipated the American air campaign, and had re-
ceived material and technical assistance from the Soviet Union to build a modern air-defence 
system.  The DRV had received modern jet interceptors, Soviet technicians were setting up 
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surface-to-air missiles and a sophisticated Soviet built radar-control system.
43
  The DRV‟s air-
defence system was updated to the most complex and capable any nation had had since World 
War II.  By late 1967, ROLLING THUNDER had inflicted an estimated $300 million damag-
es to North Vietnam and had cost more than seven hundred aircraft worth $900 million – not a 
very flattering cost-benefit ratio.  This is another example of the effectiveness of fortified 
compound warfare when a major supporter, here Soviet Union, is willing to supply the re-
ceiver with modern technology.
44
 
The Americans failed to nullify compound warfare.  Hanoi was not just supporting the PLA, 
but directing it, the end state being a unified Vietnam under Communist leadership.  As soon 
as the Americans entered the theatre, the conventional war between the United States and the 
DRV started.  The Americans imposed restrictions on themselves, restrictions that had not 
been there during WWII against the Germans. The American political system would not ac-
cept for example carpet bombings of major cities, or destruction of the dikes upstream along 
the Red River, both of which would have caused significant damage to the infrastructure of 
the DRV, and civilian casualties as well.
45
  The Johnson administration limited the ground 
fighting to South Vietnam alone, leaving the support lines and staging bases in eastern Laos 
and Cambodia (almost) untouched.  All this was due to the fear that China or the Soviets 
could directly enter the war.
46
  Thus the DRV had powerful allies, China and Soviet Union
47
, 
sanctuaries and supply routes in Laos and Cambodia, and the support of the rural people in 
South Vietnam – all elements for successful fortified compound warfare.48 
The American forces in South Vietnam relied on heavy firepower and use of modern technol-
ogy.  They wanted to engage the enemy at long range rather than close in as the PLA pre-
ferred.  It was typical of the American forces to use massive artillery shelling and air support 
during their battles with the PLA.   According to Military Assistance Command in Vietnam 
(MACV) the PLA had suffered significant losses by the end of 1967, but these numbers can 
be questioned, since the casualty figures caused to the PLA were either inaccurate or too op-
timistic, or a number of killed were civilians.  Many outsiders questioned the American ap-
proach of fighting insurgents with massive firepower.  Since the guerrilla war was mostly 
fought in the countryside instead of in the cities, the rural Vietnamese society was being de-
stroyed, and bombed heavily which was not the best political solution, whereas social reform 
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probably was.
49
  Again, the destruction in the countryside worked counterproductively for the 
Americans.
50
  The American military leadership at MACV thought doubtless their strategy of 
attrition warfare against the Communists was working, yet the only problem was time.  The 
captured insurgents unilaterally claimed they were willing to fight for ten, fifteen or twenty 
years, if needed.
51
  Were the Americans prepared for that?  For the Americans this meant that 
speedier results needed more troops and removal of the political restrictions on the war.
52
   
The Tet offensive of 1968 shifted the focus of the war.  Towards the end of 1967 the situation 
on the battlefield was at a deadlock, which favoured the Communists.  In Hanoi‟s opinion, the 
Americans could not increase their efforts without overextending themselves.  Thus the con-
tinuing strategy would be to keep the United States bleeding till it was ready to negotiate ac-
cording to Hanoi‟s terms.  Other goals of the Tet offensive were to drive a wedge between the 
Americans and the RVN and to cause considerable damage to both, to show the American 
vulnerability regardless of their military strength and to start the uprising of the rural popula-
tion.
53
  The PLA forces reinforced with troops from North Vietnam launched simultaneous at-
tacks against more than a hundred cities and towns, U.S. and ARVN supply dumps and head-
quarters during the Tet lunar New Year holiday (which the Communists had pledged to ob-
serve).  The PLA forces fought ferociously, but at the same time terrorized people in the areas 
they seized.  In most places, the PLA forces were crushed by the American and ARVN troops 
with devastating force.  Militarily the Tet offensive was a disaster, the PLAs main forces was 
almost annihilated. But politically the PLA disaster became very important for the Communist 
cause.  The U.S. public opinion was stunned by the Communist feat.  According to the official 
assessments the war was now being won, but the live footage from the television screens 
showed otherwise – the reality of the war seemed totally different.54  The Communists had 
been able to achieve a near-total surprise for their massive attack.
55
  The American public 
support for the war declined dramatically after the Tet offensive, as the true realities – the de-
struction of the PLA main forces, was hardly reported in the Western press.  Again, in com-
pound warfare the battlefield results are not the only thing that counts.
56
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The Tet offensive changed American policy in Vietnam.  The attrition strategy was no longer 
considered the only way to go and alternatives had to be sought, since the American military 
leaders were not sure whether the Communists could match any troop build up or not. The 
opposition to the war was growing in the Congress as well.  By the end of March 1968, Presi-
dent Johnson announced the stopping of the bombing of North Vietnam as a gesture of good 
will and he was now open for beginning peace negotiations.  He also announced he would not 
run for president for another term.  Peace talks began in six weeks, but neither party could 
agree on the terms, and thus the peace talks continued for another five years.
57
 
2.5 Withdrawal 
President Richard M. Nixon won the elections in November 1968 and took office in January 
1969.  He realized the United States could not obtain a military victory, but he believed he 
could achieve a diplomatic settlement favourable to American interests.  This meant the RVN 
should take more responsibility from the American forces and carry the burden of war more.  
President Nixon and his administration planned a different approach, and decided to attack the 
communist effort by cutting off the guerrillas from their safe havens and the support they re-
ceived from allies.  First, the Americans began secretly bombing the communist headquarters 
and bases in Cambodia with some good results, but ultimately failed to prevent PAVN opera-
tions from the area.
58
  The second part of the plan was to disrupt the support North Vietnam 
was receiving from the Soviet Union and China.  The Soviets were reluctant to put pressure 
on North Vietnam, since they feared it would merely cause DRV to seek closer relations with 
China.
59
 
Although the political negotiations and alternative efforts for a favourable solution began, 
nothing had changed in the battle field.  The Americans still relied on firepower, even more 
than before, and attrition warfare.  During the period from late 1965 to the Tet offensive in 
early 1968, battles were mostly fought in the countryside, large amounts of bombs and explo-
sives were used.  Peasants were removed from their villages, the American forces would go 
in, fight the battle, and then retire back to their bases in populated areas.  The American casu-
alty rate grew steadily and little results were achieved.  This in turn raised strong criticism in 
the U.S. Congress and the American press towards the American war efforts in Vietnam.
60
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During his presidential campaign, President Nixon had promised to reduce American in-
volvement in Vietnam.
61
  At the same time, he tried to disturb the compound warfare effort of 
DRV by affecting DRV supporters politically and the North Vietnamese supply routes and 
safe havens militarily.  Orders were given to the commander of the U.S. forces in Vietnam to 
diminish operations to avoid heavy casualties (late 1969).  Troop reductions were announced.  
A strategic withdrawal from the war had begun.
62
 
In 1970, President Nixon decided to hit Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia.  The American 
and ARVN troops invaded Cambodia with the mission to destroy Communist staging areas.
63
  
Militarily the operation was a temporary success but the Communists quickly shifted to oper-
ating in another area, regrouped and resumed action as before.  In America, this was seen as 
an escalation of the war rather than de-escalation as President Nixon had stated his policy.  
Antiwar demonstrations and college student strikes across the continental United States 
caused unrest.  The Congress passed a bill that prohibited U.S. ground troops from operating 
in Laos or Cambodia.
64
 
Over the next two years the “Vietnamization” process was pushed forward in South Vietnam, 
with some success.  But the ARVN could not easily take over the responsibilities from the 
American forces; it was just not capable of doing that.   President Nixon tried to influence the 
fortified compound warfare supporters of the DRV, the Soviet Union and China, by making 
official visits to both countries, and at the same time to demoralize the DRV.  The bombing of 
North Vietnam was resumed and intensified, while the number of American troops in Vi-
etnam kept declining.
65
   
To demonstrate their strength, the failure of Vietnamization, and to improve their positions in 
the peace talks in Geneva, Hanoi launched a massive invasion from North Vietnam in March 
1972.  The PAVN objectives were to achieve victory and to humiliate President Nixon, de-
stroy his war policy and prevent his re-election.  The North Vietnamese leadership had hoped 
to destroy ARVN forces as much as possible and to occupy key terrain threatening Saigon. 
They also hoped to cause the U.S. troop withdrawal to accelerate; and ultimately to seize con-
trol of South Vietnam.
66
  Again, the Communists abandoned successful compound warfare 
tactics and went too early to „phase three‟ of their insurgency strategy. General Giap had, as 
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during the Tet-offensive in 1968, underestimated the strength of the U.S. Air Force and the by 
1972 much improved ARVN forces.  Although the number of American troops in Vietnam 
was significantly lower than the years before (estimated 65,000) they would not be able to 
pose a conventional threat to the PAVN as a combat force, but the American military advisors 
on the battle field could still coordinate the close air support to the fighting ARVN forces, 
thus unleashing the awesome firepower of the U.S. Air Force against the now exposed PAVN 
forces.  A number of times the ARVN forces were saved by the massive American support 
from the air.
67
  The Americans and the South Vietnamese gained a tactical victory, but it re-
sulted in a harsh realization that the American support of the ARVN was only delaying the in-
evitable outcome in the war – a defeat for the Americans and a victory to the insurgency.68  
After winning the 1972 presidential elections, on Christmas Day, President Nixon gave orders 
to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong in order to force DRV to a settlement.
69
  He had promised in his 
presidential campaign that the war was fought successfully and that peace was at hand.  Amer-
ican forces being pulled out of Vietnam, gave another picture.  The bombing was heavy and 
destructive, but as it was aimed at military targets the civilian casualties were relatively low.  
A cease-fire agreement was signed in the end of January 1973 and a political settlement fol-
lowed.
70
 
The last Americans left Vietnam in the spring of 1973, and the war was over for America.  
President Nixon had new problems arising in the United States that tied his hands as far as 
supporting the RVN government with air power or other supplies was concerned.  Congres-
sional hearings on secret bombings of Cambodia and the Watergate scandal intensified, even-
tually leading to his resignation in August 1974.  The PAVN began its final spring offensive 
in 1975, and as a result of this the ARVN collapsed and South Vietnam was conquered within 
three months.  The American efforts in Vietnam had ultimately failed.
71
 
2.6 Summary 
Many researchers and officers have discussed the reasons for the failure of the United States 
war efforts in Vietnam over the years.  There is no simple answer, but there are some key ele-
ments that can be pointed out.   
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1. The United States never matched the will to win the war as did the Communist DRV.  
Whereas the DRV committed all national efforts to reaching its ultimate goal to unify 
North and South Vietnam and winning the Americans was a prerequisite of it, the 
Americans limited their efforts to what they considered adequate.   
2. The DRV fought a political war and to reach political goals, it used military force only 
as one tool along with political agitation, propaganda, terrorism and international di-
plomacy.  
3. The Americans restricted themselves from using all means possible to wage war, since 
they did not want to risk escalating the conflict or a possible war with China or the So-
viet Union.  By doing this, the PAVN sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia as well as the 
supply routes, were untouched for a long time.  In this case, North Vietnam cleverly 
used the asymmetry described in compound warfare theory to its advantage.   
4. The Americans have also been strongly criticized by some critics about the armament 
and development of ARVN – it was too “heavy” for guerrilla warfare.  In the critics‟ 
opinion, light infantry would rather have been the sort of forces needed to fight the 
Communist insurgents.  
5. The Americans also faced a relentless enemy – time.  Whereas the insurgents had pre-
pared to fight ten, fifteen or twenty years, the American interest in committing to the 
war diminished over time.  This can be seen as an essential part of compound warfare 
dynamics.
72
 
The Vietnam War demonstrates the classical elements of fortified compound warfare in ac-
tion.  The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) utilized a conventional force of its own 
army (PAVN).  It had a guerrilla force formed from People‟s Liberation Army of South Vi-
etnam (PLA) and safe havens in Laos and Cambodia.  And as a fortifying element it had major 
power alliances with China and the Soviet Union.  It also demonstrates the difficulty of 
fighting against an enemy who is using a compound warfare strategy.  The inability to recog-
nize key factors in the conflict proved fatal to the United States.  The DRV‟s goal was not to 
win the United States, but to unify Vietnam under Hanoi‟s rule.  The primary enemy was not 
the United States, but the government of South Vietnam.  In this light, winning the “hearts and 
minds” of the peasants of the Vietnamese countryside, the importance of successful social re-
forms, and the general well being of the majority of the population are shown in an entirely 
new perspective, and demonstrates the difficulty of fighting a successful counterinsurgency 
war.  Or as Thomas Huber puts it: “It is far less costly to understand Compound warfare dy-
namics going in than to learn them in a harder school; failed operations”73 as the Americans 
did in Vietnam. 
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3 CASE 2:  SECOND LEBANON WAR 
3.1 Hezbollah 
Hezbollah is a Shia Muslim political group with a militant wing called the Islamic Resistance.  
Hezbollah is defined as a terrorist organization by the West.  The group is active in Lebanon, 
and can be described as a “state-within-a-state”. Along with the activities of its military wing, 
Hezbollah is also a major provider of social services, operating schools, hospitals, and agricul-
tural services for thousands of Lebanese Shias.  It has participated actively in the Lebanese po-
litical system since 1992 - having had over the recent years from two to eleven out of thirty 
seats in the Lebanese national unity cabinet. Hezbollah operates a satellite TV channel, al-
Manar, and a broadcast station - both are in the West regarded as terrorist entities.  Ideological 
and financial support for the organization is provided by Iran and Syria.  Hezbollah raises 
funds from criminal activities, such as counterfeiting money and drug production and trade.
74
 
3.1.1 Background 
The seeds for Hezbollah were planted among the Lebanese Shias in the late 1970‟s as a result 
of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1977), and two Israeli campaigns in Lebanon in 1978 and 
1982.  Hezbollah was to counter the Amal Movement, the largest Shia organization in Leba-
non at the time.  It was a new organization, separate from PLO or other Palestinian groups op-
erating in the area.  In 1982, a group of Lebanese Shia Muslims declared themselves to be the 
“Party of God” (Hizb Allah), as response to the Israeli invasions of Lebanon.  Islamic re-
sistance units were formed and were committed to the liberation of the occupied territories 
and the ejection of the Israeli forces.  As soon as it was realized that the Israel Defence Forces 
(IDF) intended to stay in South Lebanon, the (at that time inexperienced) Hezbollah resistance 
cells began to develop its military competence with the desire to resist the Israeli occupation.  
It was assisted both ideologically and logistically by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards based 
in Lebanon‟s Bekaa Valley - originally sent there to aid in the resistance against Israel.  Hez-
bollah began developing its popular base in Lebanon, and has over the years expanded and 
strengthened bout its political and military capacity.
75
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Hezbollah draws inspiration form the Iranian Revolution, and it is dedicated to the creation of 
an Iranian style Islamic republic in Lebanon, and the removal of all non-Islamic influences 
from the area.  It is strongly anti-Western and especially anti-Israel in its ideology.  Since the 
organization was founded it has received substantial support from Iran and Syria, both finan-
cial and military training support.  The affiliation between Iran and Hezbollah has always been 
a close one.  There is a strong religious and ideological tie between Iran and Hezbollah – both 
being Shia Muslims.  Iran has had a great effect on Hezbollah‟s improved capabilities by de-
livering vital material and moral support to Hezbollah over the years.
76
    
Syria on the other hand has been, and still is a close supporter of Hezbollah.  There are two 
main reasons for Syria to support Hezbollah.  Syria has had its own conflicts and confronta-
tions with Israel over the occupation of Golan Heights and it has had interests to look after in 
Lebanon, both of which still exist.  Thus Hezbollah serves as a useful tool for Syria in the re-
gions political field.
77
  
Hezbollah is a Shia Muslim organization in which religion plays an important political role.  
Shias differ from Sunni Muslims in the way they look at leadership, not the spiritual aspect of 
religion.  Shias believe their leadership, either religious or political – which often go hand in 
hand – descend directly from the family of the Prophet Mohammad or God himself.  There-
fore among the Shias, Imams are considered sinless by nature and their authority infallible 
since it comes directly from God or the family of the Prophet.  Hence the leaders are highly 
respected, and their authority unquestioned.  Among the Muslims Shias are a minority with 
about 15% of the Muslim population of the world.  The attitude towards the divine authority 
of Shia Imam‟s explains how Shia organizations may turn fanatical and be considered to be-
have like terrorist organisations in the West.
78
   
3.1.2 Early Terrorist Campaigns  
Once established as a militia, Hezbollah received acclaim and legitimacy in Lebanon and 
throughout the Muslim world by fighting against the IDF and the South Lebanese Army 
(SLA).  Its base areas were, and still are, Lebanon‟s Shiite dominated areas, parts of Beirut, 
Southern Lebanon and Bekaa Valley.  Aside from its activities in Lebanon, in 1980‟s and ear-
ly 1990‟s Hezbollah conducted a global terrorist strategy with a capability to operate all over 
the world, and they carried out terrorist attacks against Israeli and US targets. Hezbollah fo-
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cused on South America, Southeast Asia, Jordan, the Persian Gulf, and the European conti-
nent.
79
      
During the 1980‟s and early 1990‟s, Hezbollah was behind a series of terrorist attacks against 
Western targets such as a suicide bombings of the U.S. embassy in Beirut (1983), U.S. Ma-
rines base in Beirut (1983), the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut (1984), aircraft hijackings 
(Trans World Airlines 1985, Kuwaiti Airlines 1984 and 1988), the attack on Israeli Embassy 
in Argentina (1992) and a number of kidnappings of U.S. and European civilians as well as 
French, British, German and Russian diplomats.  Hezbollah was responsible for most of the 
kidnappings of foreign nationals carried out in Lebanon during that time period (at least 18 
citizens of Western countries were held hostage, and three of them were killed).  It is said that 
Hezbollah was heavily influenced, even its actions directed by Iran over this period of time.  
In the 1990‟s, following a shift in Iranian policy, Hezbollah lowered the profile of its anti-
Western pursuits and focused its attention on terrorist activity against Israeli and Jewish tar-
gets.
80
 
In the beginning of the 21
st
 century, there was an increasing cooperation between Hezbollah 
and other Palestinian terrorist organizations in the region.
81
  It was very active against the IDF 
during the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in May 2000.  Focus was transferred to 
violent activities in Israeli territory with the aim to disrupt any attempt at dialogue, or the 
peace process in general.
82
   
However, since the September 11, 2001 attacks Hezbollah made considerable efforts to pro-
mote its image in order to blur its identity as a terrorist organization.  It publicly denied its in-
volvement in terrorism in general, and in particular, its capability of global terrorism.
83
  Yet 
despite the Israel‟s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah continued periodically to 
shell Israeli forces in the disputed Shebaa Farms border zone resulting periodic conflict and a 
retaliation from Israel.
84
  In the end of 2005, Hezbollah and the IDF had a heavy exchange of 
fire across the Blue Line established by the UN Security Council resolutions 425 and 426 for 
the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.  Both sides used heavy weapons against each oth-
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er.  Since the withdrawal of IDF from Lebanon, Hezbollah had built its military capabilities 
substantially with the support of Iran and Syria.
85
    
In 1989, heavily influenced by Syria, the Lebanese administration accepted Hezbollah as the 
only militia organization in Lebanon, whereas all other ethnic militias were to be dismantled.  
Along with the weakness of the Lebanese central regime, Hezbollah‟s special status enabled 
the organization to use its power and seize both military and civilian control in Southern Leb-
anon (and several areas of the Bekaa region), practically replacing the legitimate Lebanese re-
gime. This process continued even after the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon. Southern Lebanon 
had in fact turned into a state-within-a-state.  Hezbollah thus became the ultimate authority in 
this region, undisturbed by the Lebanese regime‟s weak control, which focused mainly on 
economic development projects that were themselves approved by Hezbollah.  Hezbollah pur-
sued its own policy in southern Lebanon, which it imposed on the Lebanese government.  It 
opposed the effective deployment of the Lebanese army in the south thus preventing the Leb-
anese regime from assuming responsibility for this region‟s security and implementing its 
sovereignty.  According to resolution 425 of the UN Security Council, the Lebanese army was 
to deploy in the south of the country.  However, receiving strong support from Syria, Hezbol-
lah openly rejected deployment of Lebanese Army to the South, and carried on as before.
86
 
The Shia community had been the largest, and yet the most underprivileged ethnic community 
in Lebanon.  For Hezbollah this created a fertile soil for gaining support with an extensive so-
cial and economic program, since the Lebanese government had lacked the initiative to im-
prove the situation.  Far-reaching social and welfare activities were carried out by Hezbollah, 
including schools, women‟s affairs, health and medical services, social welfare and religious 
education.  All these were financed by the funds received from international fundraisers and 
its support from Iran and Syria.  Unsurprisingly, Hezbollah earned the trust and support of the 
Shia community as well as some non-Shias.  The social and economic programs served Hez-
bollah‟s aims to gain political power in Lebanon and its ultimate goal of forming an Islamic 
republic in Lebanon.
87
 
3.2  Background To The Second Lebanon War 
After the withdrawal of IDF from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah kept close ties to Iran and Syr-
ia and began arming itself.  High quality weapons, such as land-to-land rockets, anti-tank 
weapons, anti-aircraft missiles, mines and mortar rounds as well as explosives, small arms and 
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ammunition, were being smuggled to Lebanon.
88
  The tensions were high in the region and 
occasional clashes with IDF occurred.  In September 2004 the UN Security Council resolution 
1559 called for the Lebanese government to disband and disarm all Lebanese and non-
Lebanese militias and to prevent the flow of armaments and other military equipment to the 
militias from Syria, Iran and other nations.  The Lebanese government did not comply with 
the resolution – Hezbollah was very popular among the Shiites, it had built a considerable 
military strength, and it did not want the Lebanese army in the Southern Lebanon – Hezbollah 
territory.
89
  The November 2005 clash between Hezbollah and IDF, in its shortness and inten-
sity, was like a prologue to the Second Lebanon War the following year.
90
  The military and 
financial support Hezbollah received from Iran and Syria did not go unnoticed by the interna-
tional community.  As late as mid April 2006, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called on 
Syria and Iran to stop interfering in Lebanon.  But the situation had already developed for the 
worse.
91
 
3.3 A Retaliatory Campaign Escalating to a War 
The 33-day long Second Lebanon War was initiated by the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers 
by Hezbollah near Shtula on the Lebanese-Israeli border on July 12, 2006.  The kidnapping 
Hezbollah unit had crossed the border during a diversion attack of Katyusha rockets and mor-
tar rounds against the border villages and IDF positions. Israel responded and launched a 
large-scale retaliatory operation which eventually escalated into a war.
92
 
The war that ended in a ceasefire agreement on August 13, 2006, can be divided into three 
phases, seen from the Israeli point of view. 
 Phase I: Air campaign (July 12-16) 
 Phase II: Engagement of ground forces (July 18 – August 11)  
 Phase III: Final push (August 12-13) 
The first phase of the Israeli retaliatory operation began with a massive use of Israel Air Force 
(IAF).  The IDF imposed air and sea blockades on Lebanon.  The IAF attacked suspected 
Hezbollah command posts in Beirut, including military targets along the Beirut – Damascus 
highway and elsewhere, and tried to destroy the long-range missile launchers used by Hezbol-
lah against Northern Israel.  Israel refrained from bombing Lebanese infrastructure, although 
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the IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Halutz had suggested that, thus imposing itself re-
strictions to conduct the operation. Israel also avoided a direct confrontation with Syria, de-
spite the support it gave to Hezbollah.  Within the first two days of the war, the IAF destroyed 
most of the Hezbollah‟s medium and long-range missile launchers, along with the Hezbollah 
command centres in Beirut. Yet the Israeli retaliatory campaign met an unexpected surprise, 
when a missile corvette INS Hanith, one of Israel‟s newest and most capable ships, while 
monitoring the naval blockade, was hit with an anti-ship missile fired by Hezbollah.
93
  Leba-
nese government asked for a ceasefire on July 14, which was turned down few days later. 
According to Kober, this was the culmination point of the operation – the efficiency of the air 
campaign would only get worse as the time went on.  The situation could not be solved with 
air assets alone.  This was recognized in the IDF high command, and on July 16, the IDF 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Moshe Kaplinski recommended stopping the operation, 
but the highest political and military leaders thought otherwise. Thus the retaliatory operation 
started to escalate into a war.
94
 
In the beginning of the operation the Israeli political and military leadership was both con-
fused and indecisive of the objectives and methods to reach them.
95
  As an example, the IDF 
Chief of Staff was initially thinking of the operation “in terms of a retaliatory attack, not war”, 
and even instructed his subordinates at the General Staff level not to use the term “war” re-
garding the operation.
96
  Afterwards, it can be concluded that Israel had five objectives in the 
war:   
 Destroy the “Iranian Western Command” before Iran could go nuclear. 
 Restore credibility of Israeli deterrence after the withdrawals from Lebanon (2000) and 
Gaza (2005). 
 Try to force Lebanon to act as an accountable state, including the end of Hezbollah‟s 
“state-with-in-state” status. 
 Damage or cripple Hezbollah while understanding it could not be destroyed as a mili-
tary force, and would continue to be a major political player in Lebanon. 
 Bring the two captured soldiers without major trades of prisoners held by Israel.97      
Although the operation was initially thought to be carried out based on an air campaign, a re-
serve infantry division was mobilized as early as on July 13 (eventually, three more infantry 
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divisions were mobilized).
 98
  Regardless of the damage inflicted on the Hezbollah long-range 
missiles and launcher arsenal, Hezbollah still had the capability to fire hundreds of short-range 
rockets a day into Northern Israel. This caused serious, but above all, moral damage to the Is-
raeli civilian population living in the area. It was now finally understood by Israel‟s political 
and military leadership that the war could not be won without the ground element, and it felt 
forced to commit ground forces into battle, with the mission of destroying Hezbollah‟s posi-
tions along the Israel-Lebanon border.
99
 
On July 22, the second phase began – IDF committed ground forces in battle in Southern Leb-
anon.  The Israeli forces attacked head on against the Hezbollah forces in Southern Lebanon, 
uncharacteristically to its tradition of mechanized warfare of outflanking and encircling the 
enemy, including the use of the element of surprise.  The audacious fighting capabilities of 
Hezbollah came as a surprise to the troops on the ground.  Whether this was the result of a 
failure of the Israeli intelligence community‟s or not, has been discussed.  The Israeli troops 
on the ground faced a prepared enemy, including well prepared defence lines and bunker sys-
tems, well armed troops with missiles, rockets, and advanced lighter arms like anti-tank 
weapons and surface-to-air missiles.
100
  Fighting was fierce but ineffective, seen from the Is-
raeli point of view, and the short range rockets launched by Hezbollah kept terrorizing the ci-
vilian population in Northern Israel. The IDF operations kept building up. On July 29 there 
was an increased effort by the Israeli‟s to create a security belt on the Northern Lebanese bor-
der.  The ground troops took hold of dominating terrain and Special Forces hit targets in Be-
kaa Valley and Tyre.  Yet regarding the overall effort, it had not much effect.
101
   
Characteristic of the Second Lebanon War was that as IDF engaged with Hezbollah, they of-
ten faced fighting in urban areas.  Hezbollah had built its facilities in towns and populated ar-
eas.  It used civilian facilities and homes to store weapons and supplies, as well as for defen-
sive and offensive positions.  Rockets and mortars were deployed within towns and homes; 
with the Hezbollah soldiers rushing in and out to carry out firing missions.
102
   Hezbollah used 
the people of Lebanon as human shields for their advantage, clearly against the rules of the in-
ternational laws of war.  IDF faced the challenge of target intelligence and collateral damage – 
how to verify targets to be engaged with different types of weapons and how to avoid collat-
eral damage?  How much to limit the strikes and the use of force, if military operations were 
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carried out of civilian facilities, or in the immediate vicinity of them?  On the other hand, if 
the IDF Chief of Staff had publicly stated a threat of “setting Lebanon back 20 years”, it is 
tempting, if not evitable, for a non-state actor with terrorist status to use civilians as human 
shields.  Collateral damage would play for benefit of Hezbollah in this case; it would be excel-
lent media operations material to bring the population on their side.
103
  In light of statistics, 
this could easily be done.
104
  The Hezbollah leadership used effectively its own TV- and 
broadcast capabilities to send out their own message to their supporters, to their foes and to in-
ternational press.
105
 
Other characteristic of Hezbollah fighting during the conflict was their well trained soldier‟s 
use of the advanced weapon systems they had acquired before the war, such as anti-tank 
weapons, anti-aircraft missiles, anti-ship missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. The anti-tank 
weapons were used skilfully in terms of tactics – multiple rounds were fired at the same target 
indicating that the use of anti-tank weapons was concentrated in anticipated kill zones. Anti-
tank weapons were effectively used against IDF ground troops seeking protection from build-
ings, and these kinds of weapons actually caused most of the casualties of IDF in the war.
106
  
The anti-aircraft missile capability, which existence was known by the Israeli intelligence 
community played an important role from the Hezbollah‟s perspective, although it could only 
drop one IAF aircraft during the war.
107
  Just the knowledge of short range air defence mis-
siles possessed by Hezbollah forced IAF to change mission profiles and to use extensively 
countermeasures to avoid possible ambushes to IAF planes.  A successful ambush could pro-
vide Hezbollah with a propaganda victory.
108
  
 In the first days of the war Hezbollah damaged INS Hanith with an anti-ship missile, a capa-
bility thought to be possessed only by national armies rather than by an organization with ter-
rorist status. Israeli intelligence had given estimates of such weapons in the possession of 
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Hezbollah as early as 2003, but the Israel Navy did not take the warning seriously, and as a re-
sult missile corvette INS Hanith operated without using active countermeasures and the skip 
was struck.
109
   
The unmanned aerial vehicles supplied by Iran
110
 provided Hezbollah with another force mul-
tiplier.  With a range of up to 450 kilometres and payload capability of 45 kg it could deliver 
its load practically anywhere in Israel with an accuracy of 10 m with the GPS guidance sys-
tem.  One penetrated Israeli air defence system and was shot down by IAF 15 km from Haifa. 
This demonstrated a new threat to Israel, since the UAVs could not be detected with the nor-
mal surveillance radars and with had new repercussions unimaginable had the payload been 
chemical or biological weapons.
111
 Although the long and medium range rockets and missiles 
threat to Israel was dismissed by IAF during the first days of the war, Hezbollah demonstrated 
its capability to inflict damage and a continuous threat to the Northern Israel civilian popula-
tion by the firing of short range rockets continuously during the entire war.  The smaller rock-
ets required smaller launchers; they were moved and hidden easily and were both quick to set 
up and fire – a weapon that was used very effectively.112  There were some reports of Iranian 
promoted electronic warfare capabilities of Hezbollah during the war, such as jamming and 
successful hacking of Israeli communication, which Israel has denied.  It can be said that Hez-
bollah was well prepared to fight the war under the influence of Israeli electronic warfare, and 
could maintain its command network throughout the war.
113
 
Due to the ineffectiveness of the IDF in the battlefield against Hezbollah‟s ground positions in 
Southern Lebanon, and particularly the IAF‟s inability in handling the continuous short-range 
rocket launcher threat to Northern Israel
114
, it became evident that unless the territory from 
where the rockets were launched was captured, the threat would not disappear. This set the 
stage for the third phase for the war. Although cease fire negotiations were on-going, an oper-
ation was planned to capture the entire area south of the Litany River. The operation was ap-
proved by the Israeli government because they thought it would give both military and politi-
cal flexibility.
115
  Israeli troops in the area nearly tripled, and on August 12, the operation be-
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gan.  It was never to accomplish its objectives, because the ceasefire took effect on August 
13.
116
 
3.4 Summary 
Looking at the outcome of the Second Lebanon War, one must admit that Hezbollah emerged 
as the one having better reached its set goals for the war than Israel.  Israel could not restore 
credibility of deterrence, but the effect was rather the opposite. Kober points out serious 
weaknesses of IDF were exposed: a late perception that it was war; adherence to post-heroic 
warfare  under circumstances that rather required a different approach; the erosion of the 
IDF‟s fighting standards due to policing missions; artificial Revolution in Military Affairs –
inspired concepts; the adoption of the notion of controlling instead of capturing territory; a 
centralized logistic system; poor generalship; a hesitant and inexperienced political leadership 
and IDF dominance in decisions on military matters.
117
 All these problems could be discussed 
in some detail, but are out of the scope of this thesis.  Lebanon was not forced to act as a cred-
ible state to end the Hezbollah‟s “state-with-in-state” status. Rather this war forced the Leba-
nese Government to ask the international community for support against the Israeli aggression 
towards Lebanon.
118
   
Looking at Hezbollah‟s strategic goals of the war:   
 Survive and adapt to an Israeli-driven escalation 
 Inflict maximum casualties in forward area 
 Win limited war of attrition 
 Demonstrate the ability to strike into Israel with short and long range weapons 
 Dominate media battle 
 Enhance post-war status in Lebanon and Islamic world 
 Emerge with political leadership, most weapons and key cadres intact 
 Prevent from being disarmed after the war119   
It can be said that Hezbollah was successful in almost all of them.   
Hezbollah was unable to inflict real heavy casualties to IDF or Israel in general, but the dam-
ages caused were higher than expected, and as Israel has a democratic elected government, 
causalities is always a problem.  The long range missile weapon systems were used in the be-
ginning of the war, but were quickly taken out by the IAF.  Yet the continuous use of short 
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range rockets and the use of UAV have demonstrated adequately the Hezbollah striking capa-
bility beyond close range.  As a result of the ceasefire it was not disarmed nor was Hezbollah 
incapacitated.  It could continue to rebuild its lost capabilities, and continue to be an important 
part of Lebanese politics.  
The reasons for Hezbollah‟s achievements are many.  It can be said that Israel underestimated 
the new capabilities of Hezbollah, both politically and militarily, and at the same time overes-
timated its own capability to win the war by waging only an air campaign without the use of 
an extensive ground element.
120
  Perhaps the biggest failure of Israel in the Second Lebanon 
War was that it escalated the retaliatory operation into a war before the Israeli government had 
decided whether to conduct a short and powerful blow on Hezbollah, or to bring about a sig-
nificant change in Southern Lebanon with a large ground operation.  In addition, the Israelis 
went to war without deciding on an exit strategy.
121
   
Not only did Hezbollah possess weapons usually associated with national armies, but it used 
them with considerable precision and skill.  With modern weapons and advanced guerrilla tac-
tics included with the exclusion of internationally accepted rules of war, such as the use of ci-
vilians or civilian targets as shields for operative troops was something IDF was not prepared.  
But as Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah said “…we are not a reg-
ular army.  We will not fight like a regular army.”122  They did not, and it worked against Isra-
el, a foe thinking and fighting according to the Western standards.  The command system of 
Hezbollah was decentralized and responsibilities were distributed to smaller cells, thus giving 
the organization flexibility and strength to carry on fighting despite the fact that any of these 
independent cells were incapacitated.  During the years before the war, Hezbollah had plenty 
of time to build its defensive positions in Southern Lebanon according to their estimates of 
possible battle spaces, and prepare for the eventually inevitable armed conflict, if not war, 
against Israel.  With the decentralized command system going hand in hand with a decentral-
ized logistics system, the small cells had well planned resources available for them and gave 
them logistical independence from the upper echelons, which is often not the case for national 
armies. 
The support of Iran and Syria to Hezbollah was crucial to Hezbollah before the war and dur-
ing it.  Since Israel‟s 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon, both countries supported and supplied 
the Hezbollah military build-up extensively bringing weapons and military expertise to Leba-
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non.  During the war the support continued, and the support has continued after war as well.  
Israeli intelligence estimated that during the war Iranian advisors were closely working with 
Hezbollah.  It is estimated that the Iranian advisors helped Hezbollah create a command centre 
for targeting and missile fire control thus increasing the Hezbollah capabilities.
123
  Without 
the support from Iran and Syria, Hezbollah could not have built its military capabilities prior 
to the war, nor could it have maintained its forces during the war either.  This demonstrates 
the importance and effectiveness of external support to an organization like Hezbollah. 
The Second Lebanon War demonstrates the capability of a nonstate actor like Hezbollah to 
wage war successfully against an army like the IDF, study and deconstruct the vulnerabilities 
of Western style military and devise appropriate countermeasures.
124
  To do this, it mixed el-
ements of war to a cocktail of a hybrid war, and used these elements as force multipliers to its 
advantage.  A successful cocktail of he served by Hezbollah included advanced weapons, well 
trained troops in irregular warfare, use of media to distribute as self-profitable information, 
disregard of the lives of own and civilian casualties, the inclusion of a strong religious back-
ground and the last, but not least, the knowledge of the opponent with the inclusion of politi-
cal and military capabilities and restrictions, and especially the opponent‟s moral limitations.  
Just the kind of “Hybrid War” Hoffman describes as a “blend of lethality of state conflict with 
the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare.”125  The opponents will have organi-
zations of hybrid kind, and the means by which to reach their respective objectives; they “will 
exploit access to modern military capabilities… and promote protracted insurgencies that 
employ ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and coercive assassinations.”126  The Second 
Lebanon War served as a good example, how to fight and be successful against a western mil-
itary driven force, it lessons have been learned and studied by other organizations like Hezbol-
lah.  These are the types of conflict western militaries will be faced with in the future. 
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4 FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS 
“Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support opera-
tions simultaneously as a part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, 
and exploit initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve 
decisive results.  They employ synchronized action – lethal and nonlethal – pro-
portional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all varia-
bles of the operational environment.  Mission command that conveys intent and 
an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army 
Forces.”127 
4.1 FM 3-0 Operations 
The U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations is the U.S. Army‟s capstone manual on opera-
tions.  It shapes all of Army doctrine, while influencing the Army‟s organization, training, ma-
terial, leadership, education and concerns of individual soldier.  It is contested, examined and 
debated by Army leaders and officers, and measured against their strategic, operational and 
tactical experience before it is adapted as an accepted doctrine.  FM 3-0 Operations is sup-
posed to balance between the U.S. Army‟s current capabilities and requirements for future op-
erations of different levels from civil support operations to full scale war.  FM 3-0 recognizes 
the challenge of conflicts such as Iraq or Afghanistan the U.S. Army is involved in currently, 
as well as its part in countering global terrorism.  There is always a clear need for evaluating 
the current conflicts and to predict the nature of future ones.  The U.S. Army has the require-
ment to be able to deploy forces promptly at any time, in any environment and against any ad-
versary, for an extended period of time from stable peace through general war.
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FM 3-0 recognizes that conflicts of today are not solved with military means alone, and that 
land element is critical, but then again it is only a part of the campaign.  In order to achieve 
success in an operation extended use of all instruments of a nation‟s capabilities must be used 
– diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.  The complexity of the 21st Century con-
flicts is recognized.  Conflicts are more than just combat between armed groups, but rather 
conflicts with multiple dimensions; various armed groups operating among populations, diffi-
culties in distinguishing a friend from a foe, winning of battles and engagements not being 
enough to succeed, improving the civil situation, informing public and influencing specific 
audiences for operational purposes.  Stability operations are considered as important as, if not 
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more important, than offensive and defensive operations.  As the Department of Defense poli-
cy states:   
“Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be 
prepared to conduct and support.  They shall be given priority comparable to combat opera-
tions and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, 
organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and 
planning.” 129 
Full spectrum operations is described as simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or 
civil support operations, and it is the theme for FM 3-0 Operations.  Since 2001 there has 
been a shift in understanding that stability and civil support operations cannot be something 
the U.S. Army conducts just as “other than war” operations.  Rather the civil situation must be 
addressed by the U.S. Army forces directly and continuously combining tactical tasks directed 
against the non-combatants with tactical tasks directed against the enemy.  From these tasks 
have risen the need for “civil-military operations” and their importance to the successful com-
pletion of the mission.  FM 3-0 emphasizes the need for nonlethal actions as part of the opera-
tions, and the aspect of civilian proximity during the operation.  The complexity of the con-
flict is stressed as an integral part of the conflict as well as the importance of land power to 
victory in general.
130
 
When discussing about the adversary or the enemy, FM 3-0 concludes that they can involve 
very different groupings, like criminal organizations, extremist networks, private corporate en-
terprises, and increasingly powerful megacities or state-like extremist organizations.  Failing 
states can provide safe havens for the adversaries to hide.  These adversaries are capable of 
acquiring high tech equipment, such as mobile networks or media and use them effectively.  
Weapons of mass destruction are a potential threat in the hands of rogue states and extremist 
groups and may cause a catastrophic attack.  The complexity of today‟s operational environ-
ment is recognized, with the emphasis on the populated urban areas and new non-geographical 
areas such as cyberspace.  “All adversaries, state or nonstate, regardless of technological or 
military capability, can be expected to use the full range of options, including political, eco-
nomic, informational, and military measure at their disposal.” 131 
FM 3-0 expresses the changing nature of the threats facing the United States and thus the U.S. 
Army at the same time.  The threats are divided in four categories:  traditional, irregular, cata-
                                                 
129
 Ibid., pp. vii-viii. 
130
 Ibid., p. viii.  
131
 Ibid., pp. 1-1 –  1-3; 1-5. 
38 
 
strophic and disruptive threats.  These categories do not describe the adversary, only the na-
ture of the threat.  The adversary can use any or all of these threats in a combination. 
132
  
 Traditional threats are posed by states using recognized military capabilities and forces 
in comprehended forms of military campaign and conflict. 
 Irregular threats are posed by an adversary employing unconventional, asymmetric 
methods and means to counter traditional U.S. advantages.  These methods and means 
can include such means of irregular warfare as terrorism, insurgency and guerrilla war-
fare, and can accompany economic, political, informational and cultural means as well. 
 Catastrophic threats involve the acquisition, possession and use of nuclear, biological, 
chemical and radiological weapons – weapons of mass destruction (WMA). 
 Disruptive threats involve an enemy using or developing new, breakthrough technolo-
gies to reduce U.S. advantages.  
By combining these threats together and changing the balances of each during duration of the 
conflict, the adversaries will try to create conditions in which they can employ capabilities the 
United States and/or its forces are least prepared.  The adversaries are likely to adapt quickly 
to the changes in the operational environment whatever they will be, and blend in the populat-
ed urban areas.  They will not be limited by national restrictions; rather they will use sophisti-
cated combinations of conventional, unconventional, irregular and criminal tactics including 
information operations through global networks to achieve their objectives.
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In the FM 3-0 “Operations” neither the terms hybrid operations, hybrid wars or hybrid warfare 
nor the word “hybrid” are mentioned, but the descriptions of future adversaries nor the opera-
tional environments could well be described with the word “hybrid”. 
4.2 Full Spectrum Operations 
Full spectrum operations are the foundation or the U.S. Army operational concept.   The goal 
is to employ land-power as a part of a unified action to defeat the enemy on land and create 
conditions that accomplish the joint force commander‟s established end state.  The concept 
dictates how the U.S. Army conducts and adapts to land operations as a part of a joint force 
today and in the near future anywhere, in any situation worldwide. Full spectrum operations 
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require simultaneous combination of four elements – offense, defense, and stability or civil 
support.
134
 
Of these four elements, FM 3-0 determines that offense, defense and stability operations are to 
be combined simultaneously by the U.S. forces conducting operations outside the United 
States or its territories.  While those operations conducted in the United States and in its terri-
tories combine civil support operations, defense and offense in support of civil authorities.  
Mutually supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities are used to support operations in either 
case.
135
   
FM 3-0 recognizes the need for multipurpose and well-trained units as well as the importance 
tough and adaptive commanders to successfully conduct operations.  The importance of flexi-
bility in the execution of the operations and force design is stressed throughout the concept, 
whether operating as a part of a U.S. joint or multinational joint operation.  The need for flex-
ibility derives from the complex operational environment.  There will most likely be continu-
ous interaction between friendly forces, different groups, local population, multinational part-
ners, civil authorities, business leaders, civil organizations, and adversaries and enemy forces.  
The operations are run amongst the populations, and at the same time the civil conditions are 
to be improved and the enemy defeated.  Thus the full spectrum operations emphasizes that 
the conflicts are more than just combat between armed opponents – it is complex and multi-
leveled.  The FM 3-0 underlines that the stability or civil support operations are in joint opera-
tions often more important than defense or offense.
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In Table 1, the primary tasks and purposes of each element of full spectrum operations are 
listed. 
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Table 1:  The elements of full spectrum operations.
137
 
The offensive operations are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces 
and seize terrain, resources and population centers.  Offense is the decisive element of combat 
operations and in full spectrum operations.  No matter what the situation in the conflict is to 
defeat the enemy at any level requires a shift to the offense, sooner or later.
138
   
The defensive operations are combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain 
time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations.  
Normally, the defense alone cannot achieve a decision.  It can create favorable conditions to 
offensive operations, a shield for support operations, or counter enemy offensive operations.  
It must be done aggressively causing the enemy as much damage as possible.  The chances for 
counterattacks – a shift to offense – must be exploited without hesitation, in order to gain ini-
tiative in the battlefield.  During force projection phases of operations, the initial entry-forces 
may engage in defensive operations while the forces are building up, but they should have 
enough combat power to deter, attack, or defend successfully.
139
 
Stability operations include various military missions, tasks and activities conducted in coop-
eration with other instruments of national power.
140
  Stability operations may aim to provide 
safe and secure environment, essential government services, emergency infrastructure recon-
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struction support or humanitarian relief.  They can be conducted in support of a host-nation, 
temporary government or as a part of an occupation force if no government exists.  Stability 
support operations may facilitate reconciliation among adversaries as a neutral party.  Other 
missions may include establishing political, legal, social and economic institutions and the 
support of transition of power to the legitimate local government.  It is emphasized that the 
causes for instability must be resolved in order to achieve the commander‟s end state, rather 
than only reacting to enemy actions.
141
    
Civil support operations are conducted in the United States and its territories.  They are cate-
gorized as support of the Department of Defense to the U.S. civil authorities for domestic 
emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities.  These emergencies in-
clude natural or man-made disasters, accidents, terrorist attacks and other incidents.  The U.S. 
Army forces are used when the capabilities or capacities of the domestic civilian agencies are 
exceeded.  Primarily the civil support operations are suited for the Army National Guard, and 
they are limited and directed by the U.S. laws.
142
 
4.3 Summary 
The U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0 Operations gives the guidelines for operational use of Army 
forces. It explains in detail the universal basic military tactical principles used to successfully 
complete a mission.  I have deliberately not focused on those, but rather concentrated on the 
descriptions of operational environment and full spectrum operations of today and the future.  
The term hybrid warfare was brought to discussion, because there was a need to better under-
stand today‟s and tomorrow‟s complex conflicts.  Thus there was a need to update FM 3-0 
(2008) and take a broader look on full spectrum operations than the previous FM 3-0 from 
2001 did.  FM 3-0 underlines the need for the simultaneous application all elements of full 
spectrum operations in combinations in a given operation.  The weight of each element de-
pends on the circumstances occurring at the operational environment during the given opera-
tion, and the analysis and will of the mission commander.  Defense and offense are important, 
but in the complex operations today, stability and civil support operations are even more im-
portant to achieve the required end states.  The operations are recognized to be multileveled 
and complex – hybrid one could say. 
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5 ANALYSIS  
This chapter is divided in two parts.  First, I will discuss the similarities and differences of the 
two organizations involved in the case studies, namely National Liberation Front (NLF) in Vi-
etnam War and Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War.  Second, I will compare compound 
warfare, hybrid warfare and full spectrum operations to demonstrate the similarities and dif-
ferences of these three terms.   
5.1 National Liberation Front vs. Hezbollah 
The National Liberation Front (NLF) in Vietnam War and Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon 
War have similarities and differences as organizations.  Both can be seen as successful partic-
ipants in the conflicts they were involved in different times – the NLF in the fight against the 
U.S. Armed Forces in the 1960‟s and early 1970‟s, and Hezbollah 35 years later in 2006 
against the Israel Defence Forces.   
In Table 2, the two organizations are compared with each other. 
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 National Liberation Front (NLF) Hezbollah 
Political agenda Unify the two Vietnams as one 
Create a unified Communist state 
Form Islamic state of Lebanon 
Deter Israel from the Southern Leb-
anon 
Reason of foun-
dation 
Need to gather support of national-
ist elements together (around com-
munists) in the South 
Need to resist Israel 
Predecessor Vietminh None 
Ideology Communism, nationalism Religion, nationalism 
Appearance Initially nationalism, later com-
munism 
Initially a terrorist organization, lat-
er tried to appear as a political one  
Ideological and 
political leader-
ship/guidance 
North Vietnam Iran 
Military wing People‟s Liberation Army (PLA) Islamic Resistance 
Supporters 
(logistics, mili-
tary training, 
funds, ideology) 
North Vietnam , China, Soviet Un-
ion 
Iran, Syria 
State with-in 
state 
No Yes 
Support base The rural population (different 
tribes).  Understood that to win, it 
had to have the support of the rural 
population of South Vietnam. 
Lebanese Shias 
Understands the Lebanese Shias 
always been second class, easy to 
unify and gain support. 
War waging Terrorism (regional) 
Insurgency 
Unconventional warfare 
Conventional warfare 
 
Terrorism (global) 
Unconventional warfare 
Criminality (drug production and 
trade, counterfeiting money) 
Propaganda (Media) 
Weapons Light  Light to heavy 
Table 2:  Comparison of National Liberation Front (NLF) and Hezbollah 
If we look at the similarities of the two organisations, we can pick up the following ones:   
 A clear political agenda and ideology. 
 The political organisations in both had their own military organisation. 
 Strong support from one or more external states. This support from outside being polit-
ical, ideological, logistical, military training and economic.  For both organizations the 
external support was essential for their survival.   
The supporters of Hezbollah, Iran and Syria have substantially improved the military 
capabilities of Hezbollah over the years prior to the Second Lebanon War, by provid-
ing it with military training and advanced weapons.   
The military wing of FLN, PLA, on the other hand, received help and support from 
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North Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union, which was also essential for its fighting 
capability.  
 An effort to appear as something else than the true colours at one time or another.  Ini-
tially NLF appeared rather a nationalist than a Communist party to attract other nation-
alists to join forces with it, and later began to persuade its Communist agenda.  Hez-
bollah on the other hand began as a terrorist organization, but at the turn of the 21
st
 
century tried to appear as a political party in Lebanon rather than a terrorist organiza-
tion.  There was a shift in the actions of Hezbollah from terrorism to regional politics. 
 A clearly defined social group among the population to draw support from.  Yes and 
no.  Hezbollah support base consisted of South Lebanese Shia Muslim population, 
which was very homogeneous and the support was easy to gain.  NLF on the other 
hand, had to work really hard to win the support of the rural South Vietnamese to their 
side, since it consisted of multiple different tribes not accustomed to support the 
Communists in the past. 
 The use of terrorism and unconventional warfare to reach goals.  Both organizations 
used acts that can be categorized as terrorist acts, and used methods of unconventional 
warfare during the conflict.   
Anyhow, following differences can be found in these two organizations: 
 NLF had a well functioning and battle-hardened predecessor, namely Vietminh, a 
revolutionary organization. Hezbollah started as a new organization in the region, 
when the Arab members had realized that the Israel Defence Forces were not going to 
withdraw from Southern Lebanon.  Hezbollah was inspired by the Iranian revolution 
and was established on a religious foundation.  It can be argued that a political move-
ment, as in this case Communism, can be as strong of a motivation as religion when 
measuring the fanaticism of the members of each organization.  Thus I make no differ-
ence in this case whether the organization was a Communist one or religious one when 
measuring fanaticism, which both the NLF and Hezbollah had.  Although today, reli-
gion has potential to create more fanatical movements than political trends do. 
 Hezbollah was and still is a “state-with-in-state” whereas NLF had strong influence in 
South Vietnamese rural areas, but never had constant “state like” status – control – in a 
particular area for an extended period of time.  Hezbollah on the other had controlled 
(and still controls) Southern Lebanon as if it was its own state.  It provides social ser-
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vices and has its own militia, and even own mass media to control information distrib-
uted to the population of the region.  The Lebanese government was (and is) powerless 
in the face of Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. 
 Hezbollah is clearly categorized as a terrorist organization by the West whereas NLF 
was not, although terrorist acts such as for example assassinations and use of torture 
were not alien to NLF either.  Another difference is that Hezbollah conducted global 
terrorism targeted at Western nations, whereas the terror of NLF was regional, focused 
in South Vietnam alone. 
 Hezbollah was involved in criminal activities such as counterfeiting money as well as 
drug production and trade.  With these criminal activities additional funds could be 
raised and as a by-product have a negative effect on the Western nations 
 Hezbollah used media aggressively to demonstrate its resolve and success.  With its 
own television and broadcast stations it aggressively distributed its message during the 
Second Lebanon War implying the divine dimension of the Hezbollah‟s determination 
in fighting Israel.
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The most fundamental difference in these two organizations is the “state-with-in-state” ap-
pearance of Hezbollah.  It acts under Lebanese government in Lebanese soil, but is in no way 
controlled by the Lebanese Government, which has neither capability nor will to do so, be-
cause the Shia Muslims make the majority of the Lebanese population and any effort to con-
trol Hezbollah could result unrest.  Some say that it is Hezbollah which controls Lebanon ra-
ther than vice versa.
144
  Hezbollah has a well-trained and equipped militia with combat expe-
rience against the Israel Defence Forces.   It is an organization with multiple layers – religion, 
political, social, military, criminal, and terrorism – and it has in its possession advanced mili-
tary weapons with the capability to use them effectively.  It is a hybrid organization, represent-
ing the sort of hybrid threats the Western militaries are likely to face in the upcoming conflicts 
of the 21
st
 century.  
5.2 Compound Warfare vs. Hybrid Warfare vs. Full Spectrum Operations 
In the first chapter I stated that one of the purposes of this thesis was to answer how does hy-
brid warfare differ from compound warfare or full spectrum operations?  In chapter two I in-
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troduced compound warfare using Vietnam War as an example.  Then in chapter three I used 
the Second Lebanon War as an example of hybrid warfare.  In chapter four, I explained the 
current U.S. Army operational concept, full spectrum operations by covering the main topics 
from the U.S. Army FM 3-0 Operations.  In all these chapters I brought up the characteristics 
of each term. 
In Table 3, I have gathered information from my frame of reference (p. 10) and the subsequent 
chapters to compare these three terms.  In the full spectrum operations column I have included 
the types of operations involved in that particular matter discussed.
 145
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understand whether hybrid warfare is included in full spectrum operations as the United 
States Government Accountability Office declared.  Table 1 (p. 40) provides further infor-
mation on the primary tasks and purposes of different full spectrum operations. 
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 Compound 
Warfare 
Hybrid 
Warfare 
Full Spectrum Operations 
Conventional Warfare    
Offensive/Defensive operations 
Irregular Warfare    
Offensive/Defensive/Stability 
operations 
-Terrorism    
Offensive/Defensive 
Stability/Civil Support 
Operations 
-Counter terrorism    
Offensive/Defensive 
Stability/Civil Support 
Operations 
-Unconventional War-
fare 
   
Offensive/Defensive/Stability 
operations 
-Insurgency    
Offensive/Defensive/Stability 
operations 
-Counterinsurgency    
Offensive/Defensive/Stability 
operations 
Asymmetric Warfare    
Offensive/Defensive/Stability 
operations 
Criminality    
Offensive/Defensive 
Stability/Civil Support 
Operations 
Cyber Warfare    
Offensive/Defensive 
Stability/Civil Support 
Operations 
Advanced Technology     
Offensive/Defensive 
Stability/Civil Support 
Operations 
Megacities or  
State-with-in-State or-
ganizations 
   
Offensive/Defensive/Stability 
Operations 
Table 3:  Comparison of Compound Warfare, Hybrid Warfare and Full Spectrum Operations. 
According to Table 3, all these three types of warfare seem to be very similar to each other in-
cluding the same elements of war.  Of these three, compound warfare seems most out of date, 
since it does not include cyber warfare or state-with-in-state organizations.  On the other hand, 
although the Second Lebanon War does not categorize as an example of compound warfare, 
the resemblance to compound warfare is visible, and even clearer, if we extend the timeline 
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some 30 years back look at the development of Hezbollah and Middle East in general and 
look at the Second Lebanon War just as single battle rather than a war.  Hezbollah had strong 
external supporters (Iran and Syria), we could argue that Hezbollah is the “guerrilla” force, 
and Syria the main force, the regular army, and Iran the supporter and supreme director, all of 
them having a common enemy, namely Israel.  If we examine the way Hezbollah has operated 
over the years developing from poorly trained and equipped resistance cells, to a terrorist or-
ganization to a well trained militia force with considerable political weight in Lebanon, we 
can conclude that the basic elements of compound warfare are together, and that it is not all 
that different from hybrid warfare.  The reason why cyber warfare is not included in com-
pound warfare is mainly because in the example discussed in this thesis, the term did not yet 
exist. The Vietnam War, which served as an example of compound warfare, included the 
most advanced military technology of the time on both sides of the war.  The Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam (DRV) had been supplied with at that time the most advanced air-defence 
system, delivered by the Soviet Union.  Had cyberspace been an operational environment at 
the time, I see no reason why it should have been omitted from the tool box of compound war-
fare, since other means of advanced technology were used as well.  In compound warfare, just 
as in hybrid warfare, all available technologies and methods will be used to achieve desired 
goals by the warring parties.   
In a sense, compound warfare is a concept to be used at the strategic level of a conflict where-
as hybrid warfare more describes the tactical level circumstances within a given conflict.  
From the perspective of a Western observer, the opposing force‟s actions and the operational 
environment may seem hybrid, since the opponent‟s modus operandi and mind sets are differ-
ent from ours.  But from their respective, it probably makes perfect sense.  The use of all 
available means to reach desired end states is acceptable, and from their point of view could 
be understood as a comprehensive approach to the conflict.  Having said that, I could con-
clude that hybrid warfare is included in term compound warfare, just focusing more on the 
tactical level of the conflict. 
While comparing hybrid warfare and full spectrum operations I must agree with the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report of September 2010 on the term hybrid war-
fare.
146
  The elements of hybrid warfare are included in the term full spectrum operations.  
FM 3-0 Operations describes comprehensively the operational environment of today‟s con-
flicts, and includes the elements normally connected with the term hybrid warfare.   
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The main difference in these terms is the occasion they were brought into discussion: com-
pound warfare was the first out in the middle of 1990‟s, then full spectrum operations was in-
troduced in 2001 by U.S. Army‟s then new version of FM 3-0, Operations, and around the  
same time hybrid warfare was introduced in the military discussion.  Thus in my opinion, full 
spectrum operations is the most inclusive of the terms discussed earlier in this thesis, and it 
contains the two terms discussed here. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis was to answer the questions: what was the thinking behind hybrid 
warfare, what is it, and how does it differ from compound warfare or full spectrum opera-
tions?  In my opinion, the term Hybrid warfare appeared in the discussion of warfare in the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century, when the Western militaries became involved in complex and 
challenging operational environments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and military theorists and doc-
trine writers tried to better understand the development, including the nature of the conduct of 
warfare in these two wars.  The adversaries and enemies were flexible, adaptable and rogue, 
and they used advanced weapons and employed irregular forms of warfare.  The   U.S. Army 
was around year 2000 still using doctrinal terms such as “low-intensity conflict” and “military 
operations other than war”147, terms which were not very descriptive and unsuitable to meet 
the new types of conflicts.  The in 2001 FM 3-0 Operations introduced full spectrum opera-
tions, but at that time the new, unfamiliar term and concept was difficult to adapt to use im-
mediately.  On the other hand, the word “hybrid” is descriptive, and it is well suited for de-
scribing the nature of modern day warfare.  From linguistic perspective, the expression “hy-
brid warfare” probably gives a better understanding of the complexities and multi-modality of 
modern day warfare than the terms “compound warfare” or “full spectrum operations”.  Just 
as the United States GAO stated that the threats and wars may well be of “hybrid” kind, due to 
the descriptive quality of the word “hybrid”.   
The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) do not use the word “hybrid” 
today.  As descriptive as the word “hybrid” may be, it is still not used in the United States 
Army doctrines. The United States GAO report of September 2010 on hybrid warfare tried to 
put an end to the discussion of hybrid warfare by declaring that this was not a new form of 
warfare.   
The other term discussed in this thesis, compound warfare has “disappeared” from the debate, 
and it is not used in any doctrine document. Hybrid warfare seems to be facing a similar fate, 
or will it?  Will also the term hybrid warfare disappear from the discussion among American 
or Western military thinkers?  If we look at the most recent conflicts, the Western world has 
got involved in, the rebellion against the Gaddafi regime in Libya, it is possible to see the po-
tential use of the term.  In the Libyan conflict, we see the poorly trained and equipped Libyan 
rebels facing Gaddafi‟s well equipped and better trained army.  Then we have the Coalition 
forces led by NATO, a military alliance, comprising of NATO members, non-NATO EU 
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members and Arab states supporting the rebels with air-power, and with no interest in bring-
ing their land forces into the conflict. The Libyan oil fields provide the operational environ-
ment with a commercial and a strategic factor relevant to the world economy.  In addition, the 
Coalition entered the conflict with neither a clear end state nor exit strategy.  With these fac-
tors in mind, and possible national interests of the Coalition states, the on-going Libyan con-
flict (civil war) includes the potential elements to become a hybrid war.  Hence the modern 
terms hybrid threats, hybrid war and hybrid warfare will, in my opinion, remain to be used in 
the discussions of today‟s and future conflicts, due to the descriptiveness of the word “hybrid” 
and the ease of its use.    
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8 ENCLOSURES 
8.1 Abbreviations 
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the South Vietnamese Army. 
COIN Counterinsurgency 
DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the communist state of North Vietnam. 
FM Field Manual 
GAO the United States Government Accountability Office 
IDF Israel Defense Forces 
NLF National Liberation Front, also known as Vietcong, an umbrella organization 
containing representatives from several factions opposing RVN government, 
controlled by the Communist party. 
MAAG  Military Assistance Advisory Group, early headquarters of the U.S. Assistance 
to South Vietnam. 
MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The command and control headquar-
ters for the U.S. military effort in South Vietnam. 
PLA People‟s Liberation Army, the armed forces of NLF. 
PRP People‟s Revolutionary Party, the nominally independent Communist party of 
South Vietnam. 
PAVN People‟s Army of Vietnam (North), the armed forces of North Vietnam. 
RVN Republic of Vietnam (South), the pro-American state of South Vietnam. 
SLA  South Lebanese Army  
WMA Weapons of Mass Destruction 
